量子物理学百年停滞：一种方法论的危机
文章指出，自1928年以来，尽管物理学在粒子和相互作用方面取得了巨大进展，但其底层存在论（ontology）却几乎没有变化，主要受1915年广义相对论和1928年狄拉克方程的限制。
物理学在构建数学模型方面能力远超于更新其存在论，这导致了诸如量子力学解释争论等一系列难题，实际上是方法论的局限性。
文章认为，物理学应回归到量子革命时期的核心发现，重视物质的波粒性、原子结构和粒子自旋等物理内容，而非将数学形式主义置于首位。
问题的根源在于过度依赖数学模型方法，这与机器学习领域对大型神经网络的理解类似，需要关注模型是否构建了世界的内部模型。
查看原文开头（英文 · 仅前 3 段）
The Century-Long Pause in Fundamental Physics
Most readers first encountered quantum mechanics through its interpretations debate: Copenhagen, Everett, Bohm, hidden variables, many-worlds. The debate is painted as one of physics's deepest unresolved puzzles. After 95 years the field cannot resolve which interpretation is correct, and there is no possibility of empirical resolution because all interpretations make the same predictions. The puzzle is much smaller once you separate two questions about it: a mathematical model reproduces measurements, while a physical theory says what in the world makes them come out that way. If QM were a physical theory, the persistence of the disagreement would be intolerable. If QM is a mathematical model (a probability calculus on a wave-mechanical system), the situation is unremarkable. Einstein's "God does not play dice" was a complaint of exactly this shape: not that the calculus failed, but that a probability calculus was being treated as physical theory when it described measurements rather than what was being measured. The persistence of the disagreement is itself evidence of which kind of object QM is in the field's working posture.
The two postures look identical when both reproduce the same data. They diverge when you ask what changes if the data is reproduced equally well by an alternative formalism. For a mathematical model, nothing changes; pick whichever is computationally easier. For a physical theory, that is a serious problem requiring resolution, because two different ontologies cannot both be how the world actually is.
※ 出于版权考虑，仅引用前 3 段。完整内容请阅读原文。